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Abstract 
In developing countries, employment rates of mothers with young children are relatively lower. 
This paper analyzes how maternal labor market outcomes in Argentina are affected by the 
preschool attendance of their children.  Using pooled household surveys, we show that four year-
olds with birthdays on June 30 have sharply higher probabilities of preschool attendance than 
children born on July 1, given enrollment-age rules. Regression-discontinuity estimates using 
this variation suggest that preschool attendance of the youngest child in the household increases 
the probability of full-time employment and weekly hours of maternal employment. We find no 
effect of preschool attendance on maternal labor outcomes for children that are not the youngest 
in the household. 
 
JEL Codes: I21, I28, J22 
Keywords: female labor supply, Argentina, regression-discontinuity, kindergarten. 
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I. Introduction 
After World War II, female labor participation rates rose steadily in the developed and 
developing world. However, participation rates in many countries are still relatively low for 
mothers with young children. Not surprisingly, expanding preschool education is an oft-cited 
goal in both developed countries (OECD 2002) and Latin America (Myers 1995; Schady 2006). 
It provides an implicit child care subsidy, while also, perhaps, improving child outcomes (Blau 
and Currie 2006). While a subsidy specifically designed to achieve one of these goals will 
usually be relatively ineffective at accomplishing the other goal, the hope is that free public 
preschool could attain both. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence on the effects of pre-primary 
education is still limited, especially for developing countries.1  
In two pertinent examples from South America, Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler (forthcoming) 
find a positive effect of pre-primary school attendance on the Spanish and Mathematics test 
scores of Argentine third-graders, as well as behavioral outcomes such as attention, effort, class 
participation, and discipline. Berlinski, Galiani, and Manacorda (2008), using data from the 
Uruguayan household survey that collects retrospective information on preschool attendance, 
find small gains in school attainment from preschool attendance at early ages that are magnified 
with age.  Less is known, however, about the effects of preschool on maternal labor market 
outcomes. 
A major challenge in identifying the causal effect of pre-primary school attendance on child 
or parental outcomes is non-random selection into early education. To address this problem, our 
                                                 
1There is substantial empirical evidence from the United States that intensive early education interventions targeted 
specifically to disadvantaged children yield benefits in the short and in the long run (Blau and Currie 2006). On the 
less extensive evidence in Latin America, see Schady (2006). 
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paper uses the fact that Argentine children must reach a given age prior to a preschool enrollment 
cutoff date. The school year runs from March to December, and enrollment in the final year of 
preschool is mandatory for children that turn five years old by June 30. Children born on July 1 
must wait one year to enroll in kindergarten. Using pooled household surveys that report exact 
birth dates, we confirm that children born on July 1 have sharply lower probabilities, by about 
0.3, of attending school. We exploit this discontinuity in the probability of attendance to identify 
the effect of early school attendance on maternal labor market outcomes. 
The parameters we study, however, differ from those of much research in the childcare and 
female labor supply literature. Though many studies have estimated the sensitivity of maternal 
employment to child care costs, their elasticity estimates cannot be easily generalized to predict 
the effects of expanding preschool education on maternal labor market outcomes (Anderson and 
Levine 2000; Blau and Currie 2006).2 Additionally, in the absence of credible instruments, 
identification of the elasticities of maternal employment to childcare costs is challenging 
(Browning 1992). 
Our regression-discontinuity estimates suggest that, on average, 13 mothers start to work for 
every 100 youngest children in the household that start preschool (though, in our preferred 
specification, this estimate is not statistically significant at conventional levels). Furthermore, 
mothers are 19.1 percentage points more likely to work for more than 20 hours a week (i.e., more 
time than their children spend in school) and to work, on average, 7.8 more hours per week as a 
consequence of their youngest offspring attending preschool. We find no effect of preschool 
                                                 
2
 For the mothers that would work fewer hours than the school day, public schools provide a 100 percent marginal 
price subsidy for childcare of fixed quality, while for the mothers that would otherwise work more hours the price 
subsidy is inframarginal (Gelbach 2002).   
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attendance on maternal labor outcomes for children that are not the youngest in the household. 
Finally, we find that at the point of transition from kindergarten to primary school there are 
persistent employment effects, even though school attendance by then is nearly universal. This 
might be explained by the fact that finding jobs takes time or by a mother’s decision to work 
once the youngest child transitions to primary school.  
Our preferred estimates condition on mother’s schooling and other exogenous covariates, 
given evidence that mothers’ schooling is unbalanced in the vicinity of the July 1 cutoff in the 
sample of four year-olds.  Using a large set of natality records, we find no evidence that this is 
due to precise birth date manipulation by parents.  Other explanations, like sample selection, are 
also not fully consistent with the data. 
In terms of empirical strategies, Gelbach (2002) is the closest to the exercise we pursue in 
this paper. He uses U.S. census data to estimate the effect of public school enrollment of five 
year old children on their mothers’ labor market outcomes, instrumenting enrollment with 
quarter of birth dummy variables. The idea is that the estimated parameters circumvent the 
problems of endogenity mentioned above while being informative about whether large subsidies 
in the form of limited, directly provided pre-primary education influence maternal labor 
outcomes.  A related literature from several countries reports difference-in-differences estimates 
of preschool effects on maternal labor market outcomes, relying on geographic and temporal 
variation in policies that affect preschool attendance.3  
                                                 
3
 Cascio (forthcoming), exploits variation across the United States in the funding of kindergarten initiatives in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. She finds positive effects of kindergarten enrollment on maternal labor supply for single 
mothers of five years-old with no younger children. Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2008) study the expansion of 
subsidized provision of childcare for children zero to four in the Canadian province of Quebec. They also find that 
childcare use has a positive effect on maternal labor supply for married mothers. Finally, Schlosser (2006) studies 
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Of particular relevance to this paper’s findings, Berlinski and Galiani (2007) examine an 
Argentine infrastructure program, initiated in 1993, that built pre-primary classrooms for 
children aged three to five. Using the fact that the construction exhibited variation in its intensity 
across provinces, difference-in-differences estimates suggest that the take-up of new preschool 
vacancies is perfect. The estimates further suggest that when a child is exogenously induced to 
attend preschool by the supply expansion, the likelihood of maternal employment increases 
between 7 and 14 percentage points, roughly similar to this paper’s point estimates.  However, 
Berlinski and Galiani only find a small, imprecisely estimated effect on hours worked. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background information on 
the education system in Argentina and describes the datasets used in this paper. Section III 
describes our identification strategy. Section IV reports the empirical results, and section V 
concludes.  
 
II. Background and Data 
A. Background Information 
Argentina is a middle-income developing country with a long tradition of free public 
schooling. The school system is divided into pre-primary, primary and secondary education.  
Primary school attendance between 6 and 12 years old is virtually universal. However, the pre-
primary attendance rate among children aged 3 to 5 years old is only 64% in 2001 (Berlinski and 
Galiani 2007). Pre-primary education is divided into three levels: level 1 (age 3), level 2 (age 4), 
                                                                                                                                                             
the impact on labor supply of the gradual implementation of compulsory preschool laws for children aged three to 
four in Israel. She also finds that the provision of preschool education in Arab towns increases enrollment and 
maternal labor supply. 
 7
and level 3 (age 5). In general, pre-primary classes are held within existing primary schools. Like 
primary schools, they typically operate in separate morning and afternoon shifts, with children 
attending one of these shifts for three and a half hours a day, five days a week, during a nine-
month school year. 
Primary school has been compulsory since 1885. The Federal Education Law of 1993 further 
mandated attendance between level 3 of pre-primary education and the second year of secondary 
school. Its implementation was to have occurred gradually between 1995 and 1999, but it was 
not rigidly enforced. First, there is no penalty in place for non-compliers. Second, primary school 
enrollment is not impeded by lack of pre-primary schooling. Finally, there are still large dropout 
rates at ages 13 and older. 
In Argentina, the academic school year starts early in March and finishes in December. Like 
many countries, a cutoff date establishes who can enroll in a given academic year. School age is 
defined by the age attained on June 30 of the current academic year.4 Children can enroll in level 
3 of preschool if they turn five years old on or before June 30 of the current school year.  
Until 1994 Argentina was a relatively low unemployment country with unemployment rates 
never exceeding 10 percent. However, unemployment increased substantially after a 
macroeconomic shock in 1995 with an average rate of 14.5 for the rest of the nineties. Annual 
hours worked are high and female participation is at the level of southern Europe. In 1998, the 
female employment rate for the group aged 18 to 49 was 48 percent. 
The Argentine labor market is not very rigid. Tax rates in Argentina are comparable to those 
in a typical non-European OECD country. Unions are an important feature of economic life with 
around half the workers having their wages bargained collectively and 45 percent of employees 
                                                 
4
 See Art. 39, Resolución CABA: Nº 626/1980. 
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being union members. However, national minimum wages are set at a relatively low level and 
probably do not have much impact on employment. Finally, employment protection is at about 
the average OECD level (Galiani and Nickell 1999). 
 
B. Data 
We use data from the Argentine household survey, the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
(EPH), a biannual survey of about 100,000 households managed by Argentina’s National 
Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC). The survey is representative of the urban 
population of Argentina. It has been conducted since 1974 in the main urban clusters (referred to 
as agglomerates) of each province of the country, with the exception of Rio Negro.5 A unique 
feature of this household survey is that from May 1995 to May 2003 it includes the exact date of 
birth for each individual in the sample. We pool repeated cross-sections of individual-level data 
from both waves of the survey covering the 1995 to 2001 period. We do not use the information 
for 2002 onwards because of the macroeconomic collapse of 2002 and its economic and 
distributional consequences (Galiani et al. 2003; Mussa 2002).6  
For our main results, we use a sample of households including mothers between the ages of 
18 and 49 and at least one child aged 4 on January 1 of the survey year. The survey collects 
information on the family relationship between household members and the head of household. 
Our analysis focuses on children of either male or female household heads, because only in such 
households can the mother of a child be identified in the EPH. We further restrict the sample to 
                                                 
5
 Urban Rio Negro was included in the survey in 2001. See, www.indec.gov.ar for detailed information on the EPH.  
6
 GDP declined 20% and unemployment peaked at 24%. The results using the 1995 to 2003 sample are similar to 
though less precise than those reported here and are available from the authors upon request.  
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individuals with full information on date of birth, school attendance, mother’s age and education, 
and siblings’ ages.  When children of the same household are born on the same day we only 
include one of the children in the household. 
In the first panel of Table 1 we summarize the information contained in the EPH sample. On 
average, 58 percent of children aged 4 on January 1 of survey year attend school. However, the 
enrollment rate was 81 percent for those born in the first half of the year and 33 percent for those 
born on or after July 1. Thirty-seven percent of the mothers worked the previous week, with 30 
percent working 20 or more hours per week (i.e., more time than their children spend in school). 
The average number of hours worked last week is 12.17. The employment rate for the mothers of 
children that attend preschool is 38 percent, versus 35 percent for those that do not. On average, 
maternal characteristics such as age, education and labor market outcomes for the mothers of 
children born in each half of the year are statistically similar.  
We also use natality data from birth certificates, compiled by Argentina’s Ministry of 
Health.7 It is not compulsory for provinces to report exact date of birth, but—with the exception 
of the Province of Buenos Aires—all other provinces provide this information for the period 
2002-2005.8 From this data we extracted all births to mothers aged 14-45 (i.e., those who will be 
18-49 when their children turns 4). In the second panel of Table 1 we summarize the information 
contained in the natality records. 
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
                                                 
7
 Further information can be found at the Dirección de Estadísticas e Información de Salud website: 
http://www.deis.gov.ar/. 
8
 Natality data before 2002 do not contain exact date of birth. 
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This section describes the regression-discontinuity approach that we use to identify the effect 
of preschool attendance on maternal labor market outcomes. It exploits sharp differences in the 
probability of attendance for young children born on either June 30 or July 1. As a starting point, 
consider the following linear model for a child aged 4 on January 1 of the survey year (i.e., a 
child who is going to turn 5 in the calendar and academic year of the survey): 
  Yijs = αSijs + ′ β X ijs + λ j + µs + εijs  (1) 
where ijsY  is a labor market outcome for the mother of child i, residing in region j, and observed 
in survey round s (each survey round is the interaction of year and wave of the survey). ijsS  is a 
dummy variable indicating school attendance, ijsX  is a vector of exogenous covariates that affect 
maternal labor market outcomes, and ijsε  is an error term assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed. The model includes fixed effects for regions ( jλ ), equivalent to survey 
“agglomerates”, and survey rounds (
sµ ). The parameter of interest, α , represents the mean 
effect of a child’s preschool attendance on the maternal labor market outcome.9 Because the 
effects of preschool attendance on maternal labor outcomes could differ between households 
whose youngest child enters kindergarten with respect to those who have younger children we 
estimate separate models and parameters for these groups.  
If we estimate the model in equation (1) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the estimator of α 
is likely to be inconsistent. First, maternal labor market outcomes and child’s school attendance 
are jointly determined, introducing simultaneity bias. Second, omitted variables such as a 
                                                 
9
 In the case of dichotomous measures of labor market outcomes, we also apply OLS and interpret coefficient 
estimates as marginal probabilities. 
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mother’s cognitive ability are plausibly correlated with both labor outcomes and children’s 
kindergarten attendance. 
To disentangle the causal effect of preschool attendance, we use an instrument that induces 
plausibly exogenous variation in ijsS , but has no direct effect on ijsY . In Argentina, children must 
turn 5 years old on or before June 30 of the school year in which they enroll in (compulsory) 
kindergarten. Those born one day later must wait a full year to enroll. Define a variable ijsB  that 
indicates a child’s day of birth during the calendar year. It equals -182 on January 1, 0 on July 1, 
and 183 on December 31. Further define Zijs =1 Bijs ≥ 0{ }, an indicator function which equals to 
one for children born on or after July 1, and zero otherwise. 
We model school attendance using a linear probability model: 
 ijssjijsijsijsijsijsijsijsijs BZBZBBZS υµλδδδδδ +++×+×+++= 2432210  (2) 
The parameter 0δ  measures the discontinuity in preschool attendance on July 1.  In our sample 
of Argentine 4 year-olds, we anticipate that 00 <δ , since children born on or after July 1 do not 
fulfill the minimum age requirement for enrollment in kindergarten. In practice, the point 
estimate is likely to be greater than -1 (a so-called “fuzzy” discontinuity), since younger children 
may already be enrolled in the previous, non-compulsory level of preschool, and some older 
children may ignore compulsory attendance rules.  
Similarly, we can model maternal labor market outcomes as 
 Yijs = α0Z ijs + α1Bijs + α2Bijs
2 + α3Zijs × Bijs + α4Z ijs × Bijs
2 + λ j + µs + ηijs  (3) 
where α0  captures the reduced-form effect of July 1 birthdays on labor outcomes. Since we 
anticipate that 10 −>δ , the estimate of 0α must be rescaled by the estimate of 0δ  to recover the 
effect of school attendance on labor outcomes. In practical terms, this parameter is computed by 
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estimating equation (1) via two-stage least squares (TSLS), conditioning on the interacted 
polynomials of ijsB  and instrumenting Sijs  with ijsZ  (see, e.g., van der Klaauw 2002; Imbens and 
Lemiuex 2008). 
For this to identify the parameter of interest, ijsZ  must be correlated with ijsS , but it should 
not have a direct effect on the outcome of interest, i.e. 0),cov( =ijsijsZ ε . Since parents can time 
conception, a child’s season of birth is plausibly correlated with unobserved variables like child 
health and family income, any of which could directly influence maternal labor market outcomes 
(Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Bound and Jaeger 2000). To address this, the TSLS 
specifications control for smooth functions of ijsB , estimated separately on either side of the 
cutoff date.10 The specification above assumes a piecewise quadratic polynomial, but we verify it 
through visual inspection of means taken within day-of-birth cells, in addition to obtaining 
estimates with higher-order polynomials.  
Although the polynomials capture smooth, seasonal differences in birth date manipulation, 
they cannot capture precise manipulation, near the cutoff date, via cesarean sections or induced 
births. In the next section, we use natality data from birth certificates to show that this is an 
unlikely source of bias. Another possible threat to the internal validity of our estimates could 
come from welfare subsidies varying with school age. In this scenario, we could confound the 
effect of preschool attendance with the effect of these subsidies. To our knowledge, in Argentina, 
no such overlapping discontinuities exist in the design of the welfare system. Finally, parents 
                                                 
10
 The estimated regression functions do not fully saturate the model. Lee and Card (2008) show that one can 
interpret the deviation between the true conditional expectation function and the estimated regression function as 
random specification error that introduces a group structure into the standard errors for the estimated treatment 
effect. Thus, we always report standard errors clustered by 366 days of birth. 
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may deceive educational authorities about their child’s date of birth in order to enroll them in 
preschool earlier. This practice is difficult to implement in Argentina, since enrollment requires a 
national identification card that includes the officially-recorded date of birth. Moreover, this 
would only constitute a threat to internal validity if parents lie to the household survey about 
birth dates (in addition to the school authorities), which they have no incentive to do. 
The interpretation of the TSLS estimates requires some clarification.11  Under a weak 
monotonicity assumption, as in Imbens and Angrist (1994), the estimates are informative about 
the behavior of compliers (i.e. the subgroup of individuals whose treatment status switches from 
nonrecipient to recipient if their birth date crosses the cut-off).12  Our analysis includes children 
that will turn 5 years old during the academic year.  In this sample, the subgroup of non-
compliers includes households that choose to send their children to preschool for two years or 
more, and thus are not influenced by the cutoff date.  In contrast, the compliers include 
households that choose only one year of preschool.  Thus, our estimates are most generalizable 
to households that choose less preschool, perhaps likely to be poorer and credit constrained, or 
with less access to preschool infrastructure. 
 
IV. Main Results 
                                                 
11
 One interpretation for the parameters we estimate is that of an equivalent cash childcare subsidy. We find this 
interpretation less straightforward as preschool education as a means of childcare imposes fixed costs on parents 
(e.g., children have to be taken and collected from school at certain times) that a childcare cash subsidy may not. 
Parents likely also value the learning of children during pre-primary education. Finally, the population that would be 
affected by these two conceptual experiments might be different. 
12
 For a complete discussion of the fuzzy regression-discontinuity design, see Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 
(2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008). 
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A. Evidence on Birth Timing 
We investigate the validity of our identifying assumption by examining whether there is 
manipulation of the assignment variable, perhaps via cesarean section or induced labor.13 It is 
plausible in Argentina, where one-quarter of births are via cesarean section, with rates between 
36 and 45 percent in private hospitals (Belizán et al. 1999). Presuming that timed births do not 
occur from a random draw of the population, it is plausible that the clustering of such parents just 
to the left (or right) of the July 1 cutoff could introduce a correlation between ijsZ  and ijsε . 
We use two strategies to diagnose systematic manipulation of the assignment variable 
(Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee 2008). First, we examine the density of birthdates around the 
July 1 cutoff for clustering on either side of the cutoff. Second, we examine the distribution of 
observed socioeconomic and birth characteristics around the enrollment cutoff, interpreting sharp 
changes in these variables as suggestive of nonrandom birth date manipulation.  
Figure 1 reports a histogram of births using large samples from the natality data. Black bars 
indicate the July 1 cutoff, as well non-floating holidays in Argentina, given evidence that birth 
frequencies are lower on such days. There is a strong case that families are capable of precisely 
timing births (McEwan and Shapiro 2008). The upper-left panel shows proportionally fewer 
births on weekends, and that mothers of such births have less schooling. This pattern, common 
across many countries, has been shown to be correlated with the use of cesarean sections and 
induced labor (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 1999). To determine whether such birth timing 
                                                 
13
 In Chile, with a similarly high rate of cesarean sections (Belizán et al. 1999), McEwan and Shapiro (2008) found 
no evidence of birth timing around a July 1 enrollment cutoff.  In the U.S., McCrary and Royer (2006) find no 
evidence of sorting around birthdate cutoffs in Texas and California. In other countries, evidence suggests that 
parents have manipulated birth dates in order to avoid taxes (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 1999) and obtain 
monetary bonuses (Gans and Leigh Forthcoming). 
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might occur around July 1, the upper-right panel reports a histogram of all births. Because of the 
large sample, we restrict it to a 6-month window around July 1, but the results are robust to a 
larger window. While there are visible dips in births on three national holidays, consistent with 
the ability to time births, there is no evidence of clustering of births on either side of July 1. 
In the bottom panels of Figure 1, we summarize the relationship between birth dates and two 
variables: weeks of gestation and mother’s schooling. The circles represent the unadjusted means 
of these variables within daily cells. The superimposed lines are fitted values from a piecewise 
quadratic specification on date of birth. There is, interestingly, evidence that declines in birth 
frequencies on holidays are associated with lower values of mothers’ schooling (indicated by the 
solid dots). However, there is no visual evidence of breaks around July 1.  
In Table 2, we present OLS regression results that are the analogue of the visual evidence in 
the bottom panels of Figure 1. This table confirms the finding of no differences in gestation and 
schooling near the July 1 cutoff.  It shows similar results for a larger set of covariates that 
include low birth weight. In sum, the natality data provide no evidence of systematic 
manipulation of birth dates around the July 1 cutoff.  
 
B. Day of Birth, Preschool Attendance, and Covariate Smoothness 
We turn now to the analysis of preschool attendance and covariate smoothness using the EPH 
sample. In Figure 2, we summarize the relationship between birth date and preschool attendance. 
The top panels present results among 3 and 4 year-olds who are the youngest in the household, 
and the bottom panels among those that are not the youngest in the household. (In this and all 
subsequent analyses, children’s age is calculated on January 1 of the survey year in which they 
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are observed.) The circles represent unadjusted means of the school attendance variable within 
daily cells. The superimposed lines are fitted values from a piecewise quadratic specification. 
Figure 2 shows, as expected, that preschool attendance is low among 3 year-olds.  There is a 
small break in attendance, with children born on or just after July 1 slightly less likely to attend 
than children born just before. A larger break is evident among 4 year-olds, consistent with the 
fact that kindergarten (i.e., level 3 of preschool) is compulsory. Four year-olds born on July 1 are 
just below the minimum age requirement for kindergarten and must delay enrollment by one 
year, while 4 year-olds born on June 30 are eligible to enroll as the youngest kindergarteners.  
Table 3 reports OLS estimates of equation (2), the empirical analogue of Figure 2. Panel A 
presents the results for the youngest children in the household, and Panel B the results for 
children who are not the youngest in the household.14 In column (1) of Panel A, where we only 
condition on a piecewise quadratic polynomial, we find that among 4 year-olds, the coefficient 
on birthdays after June 30 is a large, negative, and highly significant estimate of -0.31. It is much 
smaller (-0.048) among 3 year-olds, albeit significant. In column (2), we add a full set of 
controls, including dummy variables for each survey round, regional agglomerate, day of week 
of birthday, birthdays on non-floating holidays,15 linear and quadratic terms of mother’s age, a 
dummy variable indicating female children, and dummies for mother’s years of schooling. The 
results are not statistically different than those reported in Column (1). The results for the sample 
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 A regression of a youngest in the household dummy on a born on/after July 1 dummy and a piecewise quadratic 
polynomial shows no correlation between being the youngest in the household and the July 1 dummy. 
15
 We include these variables to show that the results are not driven by coincidental overlap of cutoff dates falling on 
weekends or holidays. Nevertheless, the results reported in the paper are very similar if we do not include these 
control variables. 
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of children that are not the youngest in the households are similar, suggesting that this aspect of 
family structure does not affect compliance with the enrollment rule.  
Before examining the effect of preschool attendance on maternal labor outcomes, we 
scrutinize whether, in the EPH sample, covariates are smooth around the cutoff point. In Table 4, 
we report successive OLS estimates of an equation like (3) for mother’s age, years of schooling, 
and a dummy variable indicating whether the child is female. Panel A refers to the sample of 
children who are the youngest in the household, and Panel B to the sample of children who are 
not. The most obvious pattern is that mother’s schooling is systematically lower among the 
youngest children in each household born on or after July 1 (that is, among children less likely to 
attend school). The basic result is robust to the inclusion of dummy variables for agglomerates, 
surveys, day-of-week of birth, and holiday births. Interestingly, mother’s schooling is balanced 
around the cutoff for the sample of children that are not the youngest in the household and for 
those children aged 3. In Figure 3, we present the corresponding visual evidence for mother’s 
schooling. 
In Table 5, we present a number of robustness checks, both for the results on preschool 
attendance and mother’s schooling. For brevity, we focus on the sample of 4 year-olds. We start 
by examining whether the quadratic specification is driving our results. Column (1) is the 
benchmark; for preschool attendance we reproduce the estimates of column (2) in Table 3, with 
the full set of controls, and for mother’s schooling those of column (5) in Table 4.16 In columns 
(2) and (3), we respectively include cubic and quartic piecewise polynomials. In the remaining 
columns, we use a piecewise quadratic polynomial but within different samples. In column (4), 
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 The results for the mother’s schooling equations are similar if we include other controls and use as the benchmark 
column (6) of Table 4. 
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we focus on the sample of children born between April and September. In column (5), we drop a 
one week window at both sides of the cutoff. In column (6), we use survey weights. None of 
these changes in the specification of the analysis affects the basic results we have presented so 
far.  
In the final two columns of Table 5, we present the results of a placebo experiment. In 
column (7), we take the sample of children born between January 1 and June 30. We center the 
date of birth variable on April 1 and we create a dummy for being born on or after April 1 that 
we interact with a quadratic polynomial. We report the coefficient of this dummy variable. In 
column (8), we conduct a similar exercise for those children born between July 1 and December 
31. The dummy variable is now being born on or after October 1. We find no statistically 
significant correlations between the outcomes and these dummy variables. However, it is worth 
noting that the coefficient on mother’s years of schooling can be large (the p-value is 0.115) as 
the result in column (7) shows.  
The fact that covariates are smooth around July 1 in the natality data reduces the plausibility 
of systematic manipulation of birth dates as an explanation for the robust correlations just 
observed. One alternative explanation is sample selection. This could happen, for example, if 
relatively less-educated mothers of children born before July 1 are induced to work more than 
the mothers of children born on or after July 1, and also are less likely to be interviewed by the 
household survey as a result. Though a potentially compelling explanation, the point estimates 
are large enough to render it less plausible. On average, the mothers of children age 4 completed 
9.37 years of education with 64.4% of these mothers completing 9 or less years of education.17 
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 The distribution of years of education for the mothers of children age 4 is: 0 (0.85%), 3 (11.16%), 7 (30.00%), 9 
(22.53%), 12 (16.74%), 14 (2.29%), 15 (11.46%) and 17 (5.08%). 
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Suppose that the mothers with less than the average level of education are selecting out of the 
sample at the same rate over the whole education distribution. In this case, we need 
approximately 38% of these mothers to disappear from the sample to generate a difference of 0.8 
years of education.18 
Furthermore, we find large differences in schooling among the mothers of the non-youngest 
children aged 1 and 2 years old (the results are not reported in the tables). Almost none of these 
children attend school, so it is unlikely to result from labor-supply induced sample selection. As 
it stands, the most likely explanation is noise, though we cannot rule out the presence of sample 
selection. As a result, our preferred estimates in the next section control for mothers’ schooling. 
The unconditional instrumental variables estimates will likely be biased upwards because of the 
positive correlation between education and labor market outcomes. Of course, to the extent that 
selection on unobservables is plausible, our results might still be biased, although the direction of 
the bias is not clear. 
 
C. School Attendance and Maternal Labor Outcomes 
In Table 6, we report estimates from reduced-form regressions of mother’s labor market 
outcomes on a dummy variable indicating births on or after July 1. The variables include whether 
mothers were employed last week, whether mothers worked for at least 20 hours last week (“full-
time”), and the number of hours worked last week. We estimate separate OLS regressions of 
equation (3) for children aged 3 and 4. All regressions control for a piecewise quadratic of birth 
                                                 
18
 The distribution of years of education if 38 percent of the mothers with less than 9.317 years of education drop out 
from the sample would be: 0 (0.70%), 3 (9.08%), 7 (24.63%), 9 (18.50%), 12 (22.17%), 14 (3.03%), 15 (15.18%) 
and 17 (6.73%). Therefore, average years of education is 10.166. 
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date, while regressions in even columns include a full set of controls. Because children born on 
or after July 1 are less likely to attend school, we expect a negative effect for maternal labor 
outcomes of being born on or after July 1. 
In the samples of 3 year-olds, none of the coefficients are statistically distinguishable from 
zero. This is perhaps not surprising given the relatively small difference in school attendance 
around the July 1 cutoff for such children. For children aged 4 that are the youngest in the 
household, the coefficients in Table 6 range between -0.066 and -0.038 when a dichotomous 
indicator of mother’s employment is the dependent variable. Coefficients range between -0.085 
and -0.058 when the dependent variable is work for more than 20 hours a week. In columns (5) 
and (6), mothers of children born in the second semester of the year work between 2.4 and 3.4 
less hours in the previous week. Not surprisingly, given the evidence from the previous section, 
the coefficients from fully-specified models are less negative. The pattern of the reduced-form 
results just described is corroborated in Figure 4, which presents unsmoothed means and fitted 
values for children aged 4, for the youngest children (upper panels) and not youngest (lower 
panels). 
Despite the fact that there is a significant increase in preschool attendance among children 
aged 4 that are not the youngest in the household, there is no evidence of changes in employment 
or hours of work for their mothers. In theory, it is plausible that there could be an effect on these 
outcomes for the mothers of these children as the childcare provided by preschool attendance of 
at least one of their children contributes towards reducing the total cost of childcare. However, 
the result implies that this contribution is small relative to the cost of childcare for the other 
children and does not affect the decision of the mother to either work or work for more hours.  
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Table 7 reports two-stages least squares estimates, which are simply the reduced-form 
estimates from Table 6 divided by the changes in the probability of attendance estimated among 
4 year-olds in Table 3. Among the sub-sample of youngest children (panel A), the model with 
the full set of controls suggests that mothers with children attending kindergarten are 12.7 
percentage points more likely to work, though the estimate is not precise. This means that 13 
mothers start working for every 100 youngest children in the household that start preschool. 
Furthermore, mothers are 19.1 percentage points more likely to work more than 20 hours per 
week, and they work, on average, 7.8 more hours per week as consequence of their youngest 
child attending preschool. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The 
point estimates of the binary employment measures are consistent with the upper end of 
estimates reported in Berlinski and Galiani (2007), who used a different EPH sample and an 
empirical strategy using temporal and regional variation in preschool construction. 
In Table 8, we report a set of robustness checks for the two-stages least squares estimates.19 
Column (1) is the benchmark, reproducing estimates from columns (2), (4) and (6) in Table 7. In 
columns (2) and (3), we use cubic and quartic polynomials respectively. In the remaining 
columns of Table 5, we use a piecewise quadratic polynomial but within different samples. In 
column (4), we focus on the sample of children born between April and September. In column 
(5), we drop a one-week window on each side of the cutoff. In column (6), we use survey 
                                                 
19
 We have also estimated the effect of preschool attendance on maternal labor outcomes using locally weighted 
regressions (results available upon request from the authors). The estimates for the youngest in the household are 
similar in magnitude to those presented in Table 7 and robust to the choice of bandwidth. However, they are 
imprecisely estimated. For children who are not the youngest in the household the magnitude of the estimates tend to 
be positive but are quite sensitive to the bandwidth choice and are also imprecisely estimated.  
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weights.20 The results in Panel A are similarly-signed, but less precise than in the benchmark 
specification. The most noticeable difference is that when we weight observations using  the 
survey weights, the results for the non-youngest children in the household (panel B) tend to be 
similar to the results for the youngest children. 
 
D. Heterogeneous Effects 
We have shown that the effect of the enrollment rule on preschool attendance is not affected 
by whether there are younger siblings in the household. However, the maternal labor market 
response to the preschool enrollment rule for 4 year old children is remarkably different for the 
mothers of children with and without younger siblings. We next explore whether other variables 
that are likely to affect maternal home and market productivity, such as age and schooling, 
impact their behavioral responses to the enrollment rule. 
In Table 9, we report estimates from OLS regressions of school attendance, mother’s 
schooling, mother’s employment, employment for more than 20 hours last week, and hours 
worked last week on a dummy variable indicating births on or after July 1 for four samples of 4 
year old children: mothers aged 35 or older, mothers younger than 35 years of age, mothers with 
incomplete high school or lower educational achievement, and mothers with complete high 
school education or higher educational achievement. All regressions control for a piecewise 
quadratic of birth date, while regressions in even columns include a full set of controls. Panel A 
present results for children that are the youngest in the household and panel B for other children. 
                                                 
20
 Because in the placebo experiments from Table 5 the effect on attendance is close to zero, the corresponding two-
stage least squares estimates are close to zero as well. 
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We find that effect of the enrollment rule on preschool attendance is not significantly 
different between children with mothers of different ages. There is some evidence that the 
preschool attendance of youngest children in the household with mothers that have lower 
education is more sensitive to the enrollment rule–about 6 percentage points–but this difference 
is not statistically significant. The lack of balancing on maternal education persists for the 
youngest children in the household regardless of their mothers’ age group. Dividing the sample 
by maternal education seemingly resolves the lack of balancing in maternal education around the 
cutoff. However, this appears to be a mechanical consequence of censoring the dependent 
variable, and does not provide any goods news for identification. 
In terms of labor market responses, the effects are still concentrated among mothers for 
whom the child is the youngest in the household. Despite the fact that the enrollment rule 
produces similar responses in term of preschool attendance for the different groups, we find that 
the effects on employment and hours of work are driven by older and less educated mothers. For 
example, among the sub-sample of youngest children (panel A), the model with the full set of 
controls suggests that mothers with children born on or after July 1 were 8.4 percentage points 
less likely to work, 11 percentage points less likely to work full time, and worked 5 hours less 
per week. This is equivalent to an effect of preschool attendance on employment of 19 
percentage points, on full-time work of 23 percentage points, and on hours work of 11.65 
hours.21  We speculate that older mothers with young children are either less likely to have 
additional children or have more attachment to the labor market, and thus are more responsive 
when their youngest child starts preschool. In the absence of a comprehensive welfare system, as 
                                                 
21
 Instrumental variables results available from the authors upon request. 
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in Argentina, less-educated mothers may also have the need to return to work as soon as it is 
feasible.   
 
E.  Day of Birth and Maternal Outcomes for Primary School Children 
In Table 10, we reproduce estimates for school attendance, mother’s schooling, mother’s 
employment, employment for more than 20 hours last week, and hours worked last week for 
children aged 5 and 6 on July 1 of the survey year. School enrollment is uniformly high at these 
ages and there is no enrollment effect of July 1 births. The correlation between maternal 
schooling and being born in the second semester still persists. We find that for children aged 5 
that are the youngest in the household the maternal labor outcomes coefficients in Table 10 tend 
to be of similar sign and magnitude than those of the youngest children aged 4 we reported in 
Table 6. We find no systematic effects for children aged 6 or for those children that are not the 
youngest in the household. 
Why do we observe employment effects for children aged 5 when there is no school 
attendance discontinuity? One explanation is that the result is an statistical artifact reflecting a 
lack of balancing in the observables. Although this is theoretically plausible, it does not explain 
why, in our sample, such a correlation does not exist at age 6. An alternative explanation is that 
although some mothers find employment at the moment when their children start kindergarten, 
for others it takes time to find suitable employment so that some effects appear at age 5. Given 
the similarity in the magnitude of the coefficients between ages 4 and 5, one suspects that this 
cannot be the whole story. A complementary explanation is that, at age 5, the dummy for being 
born on or after July 1 picks up the difference between being enrolled in kindergarten and 
primary school. If the maturity of a child plays a role on the decision of a mother to go work, the 
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transition from kindergarten to primary school may be interpreted by families as a signal that in-
home care is no longer necessary.22 This is consistent with the fact that no such effect appears at 
age 6.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Expanding preschool education has the dual goals of improving child outcomes and work 
incentives for mothers. This paper provides evidence on the second, identifying the impact of 
preschool attendance on maternal labor market outcomes in Argentina. A major challenge in 
identifying the causal effect of preschool attendance on parental outcomes is non-random 
selection into early education. We address this by relying on plausibly exogenous variation in 
preschool attendance that is induced when children are born on either side of Argentina’s 
enrollment cutoff date of July 1.  Because of enrollment cutoff dates, 4 year-olds born just before 
July 1 are 0.3 more likely to attend preschool.  Our regression-discontinuity estimates compare 
maternal employment outcomes of 4 year-old children on either side of this cutoff, identifying 
effects among the subset of complying households (who are perhaps more likely to face 
constraints on their level 2 preschool attendance).  
Our findings suggest that, on average, 13 mothers start to work for every 100 youngest 
children in the household that start preschool (though, in our preferred specification, this 
estimate is not statistically significant at conventional levels). Furthermore, mothers are 19.1 
percentage points more likely to work for more than 20 hours a week (i.e., more time than their 
children spend in school) and they work, on average, 7.8 more hours per week as consequence of 
                                                 
22
 A more practical explanation is that primary schools may have longer school days and hence provide a larger 
implicit subsidy. Nevertheless, primary schools, like preschools, also operate mainly on a two-shift schedule. 
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their youngest offspring attending preschool. We find no effect on maternal labor outcomes 
when a child that is not the youngest in the household attends preschool. Finally, we find that at 
the point of transition from kindergarten to primary school some employment effects persist. 
Our preferred estimates condition on mother’s schooling and other exogenous covariates, 
given evidence that mothers’ schooling is unbalanced in the vicinity of the July 1 cutoff in the 
sample of 4 year-olds.  Using a large set of natality records, we found no evidence that this is due 
to precise birth date manipulation by parents.  Other explanations, like sample selection, are also 
not fully consistent with the data, and we must remain agnostic on this point.  Despite this 
shortcoming, the credibility of the estimates is partly enhanced by the consistency of point 
estimates with Argentine research using a different EPH sample and sources of variation in 
preschool attendance (Berlinski and Galiani 2007). 
A growing body of research suggests that pre-primary school can improve educational 
outcomes for children in the short and long run (Blau and Currie 2006; Schady 2006). This paper 
provides further evidence that, ceteris paribus, an expansion in preschool education may enhance 
the employment prospects of mothers of children in preschool age.23
                                                 
23
 However, as a referee notes, the large-scale expansion of preschool might have additional effects not reflected in 
our empirical results.  For example, one could imagine that it increases fertility, which could have countervailing 
effects on labor supply among women.  
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c
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 c
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 s
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c
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b
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a
rd
 e
rr
o
rs
, 
a
d
ju
s
te
d
 f
o
r 
c
lu
s
te
ri
n
g
 i
n
 
d
a
y
-o
f-
b
ir
th
 c
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 d
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 b
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 l
in
e
a
r 
a
n
d
 q
u
a
d
ra
ti
c
 t
e
rm
s
 o
f 
m
o
th
e
r’
s
 a
g
e
, 
a
 d
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 d
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c
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 p
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 c
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p
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c
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b
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 c
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